Merchandising allowances are fees paid by manufacturers to retailers in order to encourage the allocation of in-store promotional activities to the manufacturers' brand. I use a three-stage game framework to formulate a vertical structural model, which endogenizes manufacturer, retailer, and consumer decisions in the presence of merchandising allowances. The model allows for non-linear vertical pricing contracts using merchandising allowances paid to retailers. This differs from previous work which has focused on franchise fees paid to manufacturers. The model is estimated using store-level weekly data from the ketchup industry. In addition to estimates of consumer taste parameters, the model also yields predictions of wholesale prices and the size (dollar value) of the merchandising allowances. Counterfactual simulations reveal that merchandising allowances lead to an increase in retail profits, a decline in manufacturer profits, a decline in consumer surplus, and reduction in total welfare.
Introduction
In recent years, merchandising allowances have become a source of controversy and disagreement.
1 This growing interest in allowances is largely attributable to the amount of money devoted to the practice. A 1983 Fortune magazine article on retail trade promotions estimated that spending on merchandising allowances had grown from $1 billion annually in the early 1970's to roughly $8 billion at the time of publication. In 1999, the tobacco industry, alone, spent roughly $3.5 billion on merchandising allowances to retailers (FTC, 2001b) . Such large dollar amounts make merchandising allowances a major source of revenue for retailers and, conversely, a major financial consideration for manufacturers.
The term merchandising allowance refers to a fee that manufacturers pay retailers to encourage them to allocate certain in-store promotional activities to the manufacturers' brand(s). These promotional activities include such things as an end-of-aisle display or placement at check-out counters. The payments for these benefits have a variety of names: merchandising allowances, slotting allowances, pay-to-stay fees, shelf payments, vendor allowances, display fees, and promotional allowances. Unfortunately, there is not a clear consensus regarding the usage of these terms. 2 To avoid confusion, I will simply use merchandising allowance to refer to all payments made in order to receive preferential shelving or promotion at retail outlets.
Merchandising allowances are one component of a contract between the manufacturer and the retailer, which typically involves the transaction or invoice price, the magnitude of the allowance, and any other conditions involved in the transaction. While often discussed in the context of the grocery industry, merchandising allowances are becoming increasingly prevalent in such industries as computer software, tobacco products, and over-the-counter drugs.
While there is a growing literature on allowances (primarily on slotting allowances), few empirical studies have emerged to complement the work that has been started in the theoretical papers. In an FTC staff report on slotting allowances, it was noted that "The few studies that have been undertaken re-1 There have been recent regulatory inquiries into the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P Supermarkets) and K-Mart's (alleged) mishandling of various types of "vendor allowances." In addition, the subject of slotting allowances was addressed in a spring 2000 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) workshop.
2 For example, Feighery et al. (1999) and Bronsteen et al. (2004) use slotting allowance to refer to both payments made for new products and payments for premium shelf space for existing products, while Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997) use slotting allowance to reference payments for accepting new products only. flect opinion...rather than empirical research," (FTC, 2001a) . Steiner (1991) , writing specifically about merchandising allowances, confirms the FTC's statement by noting that, "A strange property of the entire vertical restraints literature is the absence of empirical investigations of the role of manufacturers' promotional allowances." The lack of rigorous empirical analysis is the largest gap in the allowance literature. This research represents a step towards filling the gap. From a methodological standpoint, this paper also contributes to the literature on structural models of vertical competition (see, for example, Mortimer, 2008 , Asker, 2004 , and Villas-Boas, 2007 by allowing for a way of including and estimating non-linear pricing contracts using merchandising allowances. This paper departs from the previous empirical work allowing for non-linear contracts, such as Bonnet et al. (2006) , in order to capture some of the realities of merchandising allowances. 3 In this paper, I construct an interactive model of behavior in which manufacturers compete for display space at retail outlets. The structural model is based on models of vertical competition and traditional discrete-choice models of differentiated products. Formally modeling firm and consumer behavior allows one to examine the retailer's choice of display space allocation, the wholesale and retail pricing strategies, and, ultimately, the consumer's choice of which product to purchase. The model also allows me to infer merchandising allowances. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that tries to infer the value of these highly secretive allowance payments. Using the parameter estimates, I conduct a counterfactual simulation to determine the impact that merchandising allowances have on prices and social welfare.
Using data from the ketchup industry, I find that the presence of merchandising allowances decreases social welfare. Using a measure of consumer surplus, I find that, on average, each consumer/household experiences a slight welfare reduction. The individual loss aggregates to a total of roughly $1,800 for the metropolitan area used in this study (for a single product category). This result is driven by the fact, in the absence of merchandising allowances, that manufacturers are more likely to adjust (downward) their wholesale prices in order to compete for in-store display space. On the supply side, I find that total producer surplus, which is retail profits plus manufacturer profits, is also lower because of allowances. Retail profit, however, is higher with allowances, which may provide a partial explanation for their use. Contrary to a number of anti-competitive theories, the manufacturer that benefits most from forbidding merchandise allowances, in this case, is the "category leader."
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I review the relevant literature on vertical restraints, shelf space allocation, and in-store product marketing. In Section 3, I describe the precise timing or stages of the model and introduce the full vertical structural model. Section 4 contains detailed information regarding the data used in this study. The estimation procedure is outlined in Section 5. Section 6 contains estimation results and analysis of the parameter values and Section 7 concludes.
Literature Review
Research on merchandising allowances overlaps the boundaries of several academic disciplines, therefore, a number of relevant literature sources need to be addressed. These are the literature on vertical restraints, marketing and advertising studies on the impact of shelf space, and the literature on structural discrete-choice models. 
Vertical Restraints
There has been considerable work in economics on vertical restraints. 5 Of particular interest to this study is the work that has examined manufacturer behavior when sales of the manufacturer's product depend, in part, on the level of "service" provided by downstream retailers. These "services" are activities designed to increase a brand's sales, such as advertising or in-store display. However, there might be a tendency for a retailer to "under-provide" the service, particularly if it is costly or if there is ample opportunity to free-ride off those retailers that provide the service.
Within this context, a number of papers, including Bowman (1955 ), Tesler (1960 , Mathewson and Winter (1984), and Winter (1993) , have examined optimal manufacturer strategies. The primary question asked in these papers, essentially, is whether a particular vertical restraint, such as resale price maintenance (RPM), promotional allowances, or exclusive territories, would be sufficient to induce the retailer to provide the desired level of service. Both Bowman (1955) and Tesler (1960) argue that manufacturers would benefit from using direct payments, as opposed to RPM. Bowman argues that we may not observe this as often, however, because of a concern that these lump-sum allowances violate the Robinson-Patman Act.
As the Fortune magazine article (Williams, 1983) clearly demonstrates, the reliance on merchandising allowances has grown substantially since publication of Bowman and Tesler's articles. And yet, as Steiner points out, there remains an absence of empirical work on manufacturers' promotional allowances. In this paper, I assume that manufacturers use merchandising allowances to induce the retailer to provide a promotional service, namely improved shelf space.
Marketing and Advertising Literature
Relevant literature in the marketing and advertising fields focuses primarily on two specific areas: how retailers allocate shelf space and the impact that shelf space has on retail sales.
The work devoted to examining how retailers determine shelf space allocation typically involves developing a mathematical algorithm in which a retailer compares his expected profits under all possible shelving combinations.
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Whether these models are static (Borin et al., 1994) or dynamic (Corstjens and Doyle, 1983) , the main idea is that the retailer has limited space to store goods and must, then, determine which mix of products earns her the greatest profit.
Chen et al. (1999) models the retailer optimizing his shelf space allocation (across all product categories) in order to attract the most consumers, by increasing the probability that a consumer will be able to find his or her preferred brands. The assumption is that the more shelf space (as measured in linear feet) category j has at retailer i, the more likely that the consumer will be able to find his or her preferred brand (in category j) at retailer i. The models of this type overlook some important decision variables, such as the role merchandising/slotting allowances may play in retailer decisions.
A natural question to ask is whether shelf space location actually matters for sales. According to the literature, the answer is yes. Several studies have used reduced form models to estimate the impact of shelf space on price elasticity (often referred to as "space elasticity"). These studies conclude that shelf space does matter, but its magnitude may not be that large compared to other variables, such as price (Frank and Massy, 1970 , Curhan, 1972 , and Bommer and Walters, 1996 . A cross-category study by Chiang and Wilcox (1997) also finds a strong correlation between dollar sales and the shelf space 6 The term shelving combinations here typically refers to different combinations of facings for each product. allocation. Drèze et al. (1994) is one of the few papers that draws a clear distinction between shelf space, measured as the number of facings or store-keeping units (SKUs), and the position of the product on the shelf. After conducting a series of field experiments at sixty Dominick's Finer Foods stores in the Chicago area, they conclude that the position on the shelf is far more important, in determining sales, than the number of facings.
7 While this result is promising, the majority of work has largely overlooked the role that positioning can play in retail sales. Areni et al. (1999) use field and laboratory experiments to test whether point-of-purchase displays increase sales of the featured brand. Since their paper does not attempt to model consumer behavior explicitly, it is difficult to generalize from their findings.
Vertical Structural Models
The modeling technique used in this paper is based on discrete-choice structural models of differentiated products. The majority of recent papers in this research area, such as Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005), Chintagunta et al. (2003) , Manuszak (2000) , Nevo (2001) , Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2003a, henceforth BDG) , Mortimer (2008) , Asker (2004), and Villas-Boas (2007) , can trace their roots to Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995, henceforth BLP) .
The key element to vertical structural models is that they formally model both the upstream and downstream firms in the vertical channel. In the majority of these vertical models, such as those cited above, manufacturers set a wholesale price for the product and retailers set the retail price as some mark-up over the wholesale price, taking the wholesale price as given (NashBertrand competition). Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) , in a more recent study, also formally model the vertical channel, allowing for variation in "conduct", to determine how observed prices compare with Nash prices.
Research by Bonnet et al. (2006) , which is itself an empirical extension to Rey and Verge's (2004) theoretical work, expand upon the traditional NashBertrand in empirical work by allowing for non-linear pricing contracts in the vertical channel (a franchise fee along with a wholesale price or RPM). 8 As, perhaps, the model most similar to mine, it may be worthwhile to explain the conceptual differences between our work. The first notable difference is that Bonnet et al. introduce non-linear pricing through a franchise fee paid 7 Drèze et al., in fact, state that "A couple of facings at eye level did more for a product than five facings on the bottom shelf."
8 Bonnet et al. outline a variety of possible contracts and then try to empirically determine which best fits the observed data.
to manufacturers. Such a contract may fit numerous situations, such as those where RPM is suspected, but it is not consistent with the practice of merchandising/slotting allowances which are paid by manufacturers.
Bonnet et al. are able to estimate/infer the value of the franchise fee by assuming that manufacturers hold total bargaining power, which allows them to obtain the retailers' surplus. 9 In my model, on the other hand, I am able to estimate/infer the value of the merchandising allowance by tying its payment to the retailer's in-store promotion decision. The lack of retail profit and the assumption of (complete) manufacturer bargaining power are at odds with stylized facts surrounding the use of merchandising allowances. Bonnet et al.'s model, however appropriate in other situations, would be unable to accurately predict the outcome of a merchandising allowance ban, which is the focus of this paper.
The Model
Manufacturers, within the ketchup category, compete with each other over display space at retail outlets. Each manufacturer offers a merchandising allowance to the retailer in exchange for an agreement to devote in-store display space to the manufacturer's brand. 10 Retailers are assumed to be "local monopolists" and have enough shelf space to stock each product. 11 The retailer must decide which product will receive the display space and decide retail prices. I allow for the possibility that the retailer awards the display space to a product outside of the ketchup category.
12 I refer to this option, throughout, as the retailer's "outside display option." 9 The zero-profit retailer participation constraint, therefore, determines the level of the franchise fee. 10 The inherent idea present in this model can be easily summarized by what one marketer familiar with the grocery industry told me: "the days of supermarkets doing things, without being paid, are long gone."
11 Allowing for competition downstream might produce interesting results as downstream competition could potentially dampen the relative power of the retailer. However, Slade (1995) finds that over 90 percent of households do not engage in comparison shopping between grocery stores in order to find the lowest price. Therefore, the assumption of a local monopoly does not seem inappropriate.
12 Indeed, in my data, the retailer devotes the display space to a product outside the category a majority of the time.
The Game
The interaction between manufacturers and retailers is modeled as a threestage game.
First Stage. In the first stage of the game, each manufacturer j offers the retailer a menu of two wholesale price-merchandising allowance combinations. One combination, denoted (w j j , A j ), represents the wholesale price (w j j ) and merchandise allowance (A j ) to be paid, conditional upon the retailer selecting product j for the in-store display space. The other combination, denoted (w 0 j , 0), represents the wholesale price (w 0 j ) to be paid if any product other than j receives the in-store display space.
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Second Stage. In the second stage, the retailer decides whether to award the display space to one of the ketchup products or whether to award the space to a product from some other category. The retailer does this by evaluating expected total store profit under each possible display configuration.
Third Stage. In the final stage, the retailer sets a retail price (p j ) for each of the J products. This price is conditional upon the retailer's display choice. Figure 1 illustrates a simple duopoly version of this game in which two ketchup manufacturers compete for display space at a monopolist retailer. I now discuss the full structural model, beginning in the game's final stage (consumer choice) and working backwards to the manufacturer's behavior. 13 Note that the manufacturer pays an allowance only when selected for the display space. A j , therefore, is set to 0 in this case. 
Utility and Demand
A consumer i visits a retail store r (r = 1, ..., R) during week t (t = 1, ..., T ) and chooses either to purchase one of the J products in the ketchup category or chooses not to purchase any of the products in the ketchup category. The indirect utility consumer i receives from purchasing product j during a week t trip to retail store r is given by:
where x jrt is a vector of observable characteristics for product j, d jrt indicates whether product j is on display in store r during week t, p jrt is the price of product j at retail store r in week t, ξ jrt represents unobserved (by the econometrician) characteristics of product j that are common across all consumers shopping in store r during week t, and ε ijrt is an i.i.d. stochastic term capturing consumer i's idiosyncratic utility. It is assumed that ε ijrt is distributed Type I extreme value.
The coefficients (α i , β i ) capture consumer i's tastes for attributes x and price p. The coefficient β d ij captures the impact that product j's display has on consumer i's utility. A priori, one would expect β d ij to be positive, if display space is beneficial. The impact of display is allowed to vary over products. By allowing display space to enter the model in this fashion, I am implicitly assuming that display space causes consumers to view the product differently. Possible explanations are that a product on display may be perceived as being more popular or of a higher quality.
14 Before preceding further, let me briefly discuss the attributes (x) included in the analysis. Ketchup is essentially a homogeneous good. Product-dummies (along with the unobserved component ξ) are, therefore, included to account for differences across products, which cannot be attributed to differences in ingredients. To capture variation across stores, I also include store-dummies. Finally, I include a "summer" fixed effect to capture any likely seasonal effects on the demand for ketchup.
In terms of consumer tastes and preferences, I adopt a random coefficients framework to model individual variations from mean preferences. More formally, I model:
where (α, β) are the mean preferences for price and observable characteristics, ∆ i is a d × 1 vector of consumer demographics, Γ is a (K + 1) × d matrix of coefficients that illustrate how tastes for product characteristics vary with consumer demographics, ν i represents additional characteristics of consumer i which are not captured through included demographic information and are unobservable to the econometrician, and L is a matrix of coefficients that allows for correlation between taste coefficients. Inclusion of ν i accounts for the possibility that individuals with identical observed demographic characteristics may have different tastes for price and observable characteristics. The ν i are assumed to be independent from ∆ i and are distributed i.i.d. standard normal.
As is usually assumed, consumers have the ability to by-pass purchasing any of the offered brands. This is referred to as purchasing the "outside good" or the "no purchase" option. For identification purposes, I normalize the indirect utility from the outside option to be: 14 An alternative approach could be to allow shelf space to inform consumers about the existence of a particular product. The shelf space allocation, therefore, would determine a consumer's choice set. Goeree (2008) takes this approach in modeling the effects of advertising on the demand for personal computers. Since ketchup is the product used in this paper, I feel that knowledge of available options is less of an issue than it may be in other categories.
For each consumer i, I am interested in three distinct choice probabilities:
(1) the probability that j is chosen when it is on display, (2) the probability j is chosen when another ketchup product k is on display, and (3) the probability that j is chosen when none of the products in the ketchup category are on display. Integrating these individual choice probabilities over the distribution of (observed and unobserved) demographic characteristics yields (conditional) market share equations. I approximate this integral using the simulation technique described by Nevo (2000) . Rather than sampling individuals from the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS), as Nevo does, I make use of ACNielsen's panel data set. For each store in my sample, I have information on the identity of ACNielsen panelists that shopped at that store during the sample period.
Behavior of the Firms 3.3.1 The Retailer's Problem
A retailer r takes the offers, which constitute a menu of wholesale-merchandising allowance pairs, from the manufacturers of all products (both ketchup and non-ketchup) and decides how to allocate the display space by comparing the expected total store profit earned under all possible display configurations. The retailer's expected total store profit can be thought of as having three components: (1) sales profit from the ketchup category, 15 (2) sales profit from all other categories, and (3) the merchandising allowance payment.
Retailer r's expected total store profit during week t, conditional on choosing to display ketchup product j is:
where π jrt is the retailer's sales profit from the ketchup category (conditional on displaying ketchup product j), π AOC rt is the retailer's sales profit from all other categories, and A jrt is the merchandising allowance payment made by product j. The retailer, by design, collects an allowance only from the displayed product. Because there are a number of possible sources of heterogeneity across retail outlets, I allow A to be retailer-specific.
In equation (4), notice that, for simplicity, I do not allow π AOC rt to vary with the brand of ketchup on display. The assumption is that the identity of the ketchup product on display does not impact sales in other product categories.
Retailer r's expected total store profit during week t, conditional on choosing to display a non-ketchup product is:
where π 0rt and π AOC rt are defined as above, A 0rt is the merchandising allowance payment made by the "outside product," and ∆π AOC rt represents the change in retailer sales profit from all other categories due to displaying a nonketchup product. Because I do not separately model all of the other categories the retailer carries, it is not possible (empirically) for me to distinguish between ∆π AOC rt and A 0rt . I, therefore, define π rt = ∆π
π rt is treated b as a parameter to be estimated. In order to estimate this parameter, I rely on an additional moment condition, which compares the retailer's observed display choice with that predicted by my model. 16 I can now rewrite retailer r's expected total store profit during week t, conditional on choosing to display a non-ketchup product as:
I can further characterize the expected profit retailer r receives when displaying (ketchup) product j as:
is the retail price of product j (k) at store r in week t when brand j has been chosen for display, w j jrt (w 0 krt ) is the wholesale price of product j (k) paid by store r when product j has been chosen for display, M rt is the size of the market for retailer store r during week t, and S jrt|D=j (S krt|D=j ) is the market share of product j (k) at retail store r, conditional upon product j receiving the display space. Note that I assume retailer marginal costs are zero.
The retailer selects optimal prices by taking w as given and solving the following first-order conditions:
An assumption inherent in the first-order conditions presented in equations (7) and (8) is that there are no cross-category effects of ketchup price changes (i.e.
∂π AOC rt ∂p jrt = 0, ∀ j ). While it may be the case that ketchup prices affect sales of products in some categories, this study ignores those effects for reasons of feasibility.
The solution to the system of first-order conditions expressed in equations (7) and (8) determine the optimal (conditional) retail prices.
The Manufacturer's Problem
The profit-maximizing manufacturer faces two problems: choosing conditional wholesale prices (w's) and a lump sum merchandising allowance (A) to offer each retailer. Because of the secrecy surrounding manufacturer merchandising allowances, I assume that while manufacturer j knows the true value of the allowance offer she makes to retailer r, she does not know the true value of the merchandising allowances offered by her rivals. Perhaps because of previous interactions, however, manufacturer j knows the distribution of the allowances.
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In other words, manufacturer j believes manufacturer k's merchandising allowance offer to be A krt + e krt , where e ∼ N(0, σ 2 e ) and σ 2 e is a parameter to be estimated. 18 The manufacturer, then, in choosing their optimal menu of prices (to offer the retailer), maximizes expected profit.
To illustrate this, consider a simplified situation where the retailer faces three possible display choices: two ketchup products (j,k) and the outside choice. Manufacturer j knows its own allowance offer and, therefore, Π rt|D=j . They do not, however, know Π rt|D=k and Π rt|D=0 with certainty. Manufacturer j views these profits as:
Manufacturer j, therefore, believes the probability of being selected for the in-store display (φ jrt ) to be:
This can easily be extended to J products. I now discuss manufacturer expected profits.
In determining expected manufacturer profit, it is necessary to allow for the possibility that a single manufacturer produces more than one product within the category. 19 To allow for this possibility, I define B m as the set of products produced by manufacturer m. Using this notation, manufacturer m's expected profit (EΠ m rt ) at retailer r during week t can be written:
where mc it is the marginal cost of producing product i. I assume that the manufacturer's marginal cost of production does not vary with the retailer's display choice. The optimal (conditional) wholesale prices (w i irt and w 0 irt ) and the optimal allowance offer A irt are solutions to the following first-order conditions:
and ∂EΠ m rt
If manufacturer j changes the conditional wholesale price w j jrt , for example, the conditional profit (Π m rt|D=j ) would be impacted, but so would each of the display probabilities (φ j for all j = 0, 1, ..., J). Before proceeding, it is necessary to briefly discuss the derivative of sales with respect to wholesale price (
20 Note that this derivative can be simplified as:
Evaluating the first term (
) is straightforward in the logit model. The second term (
, which is often called the retailer's "pass-through" rate, requires some additional explanation. I evaluate the pass-through rates by totally differentiating the retailer's profit maximizing first-order conditions. This approach is less restrictive than some alternatives (such as Besanko et al., 1998) , who assume ∂p j ∂w j = 1) and appears to be supported by empirical evidence (BDG, 2003b) .
The system of J * (J+1) downstream first-order conditions and 3J upstream first-order conditions characterize the Nash equilibrium at retailer r during time period t.
Data Description
To estimate the model presented in Section 3, data on a number of different elements are necessary. In general, the data can be divided into several broad categories: product sales at each retailer, prices of each product for each retail outlet, information on retailer display choices, brand characteristics, consumer demographic information, and supply-side cost data.
Sales & Cost Data
I use weekly store-level data on sales, price, and display that were collected by ACNielsen in Springfield, Missouri. 21 The data, which come from 9 retail stores, all belonging to the same chain, over a 102 week period (from 1986 to 1988) were collected through retail checkout scanners. The data include five products from four different manufacturers. The one difference being that two sizes of Heinz ketchup are included (the 32 ounce bottle and the 28 ounce bottle). Summary statistics for the (conditional) market shares, prices, and display activities appear in Table 1 . To derive the market shares, I divide the weekly unit sales by the market size, which is estimated by utilizing ACNielsen's panel of 2,500 households in Springfield, Missouri (during the same time period). By determining store traffic from the panelists, I then extrapolate that to population as a whole. The price data in Table 1 are shown at both the price-per-bottle and priceper-ounce levels. The display variable is an indicator, which takes on the value 1 during a week in which the product was on-display at a given retail store. As Table 2 illustrates, the majority of the time a product is on display, it appears in an end-of-aisle display (82 percent). In terms of the effectiveness of display, when a ketchup product is on display at a retail store, the displayed product usually accounts for over 60 percent of the store's weekly category sales. When Heinz 32 ounce bottle is the displayed brand, this percentage is even higher. Before progressing, it is worthwhile to explore the degree of variation in the display choices made by the nine retail stores included in the data. Because all stores belong to the same chain, there may be concern about whether it is appropriate to model each store as (individually) selecting their display choice. I include Table 3 to address this potential concern. Table 3 shows the correlation between retail choices to display a ketchup product. The purpose of Table 3 is to examine how likely it is that any two stores both display (or do not display) ketchup during the same week.
22 As the Table 4 looks at differences in the identity of the product retailers choose to display (conditional on displaying a ketchup product). Not surprisingly, Heinz 32 ounce bottle is the most frequently displayed product (this was also shown in Table 1 ). As there is variation in stores' choices about whether to display ketchup, there also appears to be noticeable variation in the products chosen to display. For example, Store 2 displays Heinz 32 ounce bottle and Hunt's about 25 percent of the time (each), while Store 4 displays the Heinz 32 ounce bottle 50 percent of the time and Hunt's only about 3 percent of the time. Recall that ketchup is a homogeneous good. This homogeneity makes identification of observable product characteristics impossible. I, therefore, use product and store dummies to capture much of the variation. I also include a "summer" dummy variable during all weeks between Memorial Day and Labor Day to capture possible seasonal effects.
On the supply side, I include three measures of the cost of production: the average hourly earnings of production workers in the canned fruits and vegetables industry, the price index for tomatoes, and the price index for glass containers. All three of these measures are available through the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). These measures, which are reported on a monthly basis, must be converted to weekly values. I do this using the linear filtering of Slade (1995) . 
Demographic Data
Data on observed demographic characteristics were obtained through ACNielsen's household panel of 2,500 shoppers in Springfield, Missouri. In this study, I use household demographic information on three measures: total household income, the number of hours worked per adult, and the number of members in the household. The household income level should be an important factor in determining consumer price sensitivity. Information on the length of the adults' workweek might give some indication about the likelihood that the household relies upon "quick meals," which may often include foods commonly used with ketchup (hot dogs, hamburgers, french fries). Finally, the number of members in the household might provide some relation to price sensitivity and might also give an indication of the number of children in the household.
Estimation
In this section, I describe the algorithm used to estimate the model presented in Section 3. The estimation algorithm is, generally, based on the algorithm used in other random coefficients logit models of demand. I begin by making an initial draw of the non-linear parameters in the model (θ 2 = (Γ, L, π, σ 2 e )). For these given parameters, I invert the market share b 23 Under Slade's approach, the vector of weekly cost measures is assumed to be the value of each variable in the corresponding month. The series is then smoothed using the following equation: z t = 0.25z t−1 + 0.5z t + 0.25z t+1 . In this manner, the value of the weekly cost b variable in the first (last) week of each month is a combination of the current and previous (following) month's values. I also construct an alternative smoothed series by placing equal weights (1/3) on each of the monthly valuations. The parameter estimates were virtually unaffected. equation (S jrt ) using BLP's contraction mapping technique to obtain δ jrt , where δ jrt = x jrt β + d jrt β d j − αp jrt + ξ jrt . As has been noted in the literature, it is likely that price will be correlated with unobserved product characteristics, implying that E £ p jrt ξ jrt |ξ jrt ¤ 6 = 0. To control for this correlation, I use the standard instrumental variables approach, using exogenous product characteristics and factor prices (hourly wages and the two price indices) as instruments. Finally, using the parameter estimates (b α, b β), I calculate the predicted residual from the IV regression:
The next step is to derive a similar residual based on the manufacturers' marginal cost equation. I assume that marginal cost (mc jt ) is determined by observed (c t ) and unobserved factor prices (η jt ). I further assume the following functional form: mc jt = c t γ j + η jt . To perform this regression, it is necessary to obtain the vector of marginal costs implied by the retailer and manufacturer first-order conditions.
The key to understanding this step is to recognize that the manufacturer's wholesale price (w) is a function of its marginal cost. The retailer's optimal price is a function of the wholesale price and, therefore, indirectly a function of the manufacturer's marginal cost.
24 If closed form solutions were possible, one could substitute out w and p and express the profit-maximizing first-order conditions as functions of mc. Finding the vector of mc jt , therefore, involves finding the values for mc jt that satisfy the system of first-order conditions (equations (7), (8), and (10-12)).
After obtaining the vector of implied marginal costs, I regress them on the observed cost measures (c t ) to obtain estimates of γ j . I assume that the observed cost measures are uncorrelated with the unobserved cost measures (i.e. E[c t η jt ] = 0). Using the parameter estimates (b γ j ), I calculate the predicted residual from the cost regression:
I also impose one final moment condition, which measures how well my model predicts the retailer's display choice by comparing retailer r's display decision for brand j in week t (d jrt ) with the probability j receives the display space, as implied by my model (φ jrt ). The residual φ jrt is defined: b b φ jrt = d jrt − φ jrt . I then stack the vector of demand and supply-side residuals, along with the display choice residual, into a single vector of residuals ω, where:
Finally, the GMM estimation procedure relies on constructing a set of orthogonality conditions using instrumental variables. Specifically, if I define Z as a matrix of exogenous instruments, the GMM estimation relies upon the relation that E[ω 0 Z] = 0. I use the exogenous product characteristics and factor prices as instruments. The GMM objective function, then, is
6 Results
Parameter Estimates
Coefficients for brand and store dummies, as well as price, appear in Table 5 .
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For each product j, the two coefficients reported represent the product-dummy and the product-specific effect of display space. 26 I refer to the coefficient on the display indicator as the product's "quality boost." These quality boosts are positive and significant for Heinz (32 oz.), Hunts, and Catalina, indicating that consumers, on average, tend to have a better perception of these brands when they appear on display. The quality boosts for Heinz (28 oz.) and Del Monte are very close to zero and statistically insignificant, leading to the conclusion that there is little, if any, benefit for these brands.
27 Heinz (32 oz.), which has the highest inferred quality (from the product dummy) also has the largest boost from the display space. It is interesting to note that different sizes of the same brand (Heinz ketchup) respond differently to display. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of more prominent space at the retail outlet by plotting two demand curves for Heinz (32 oz.). The dashed line represents the demand for Heinz (32 oz.) when it has an in-store display, while the solid line represents the demand for Heinz (32 oz.) when another product has received the display space. The latter demand curve, as we might anticipate, lies below the demand curve Heinz faces when on display. The difference between the two is non-negligible, as the "boost" is statistically significant. The maximum horizontal difference between the curves (i.e. the difference in shares for a given price level) is approximately 0.3411 and the mean horizontal difference is 0.1414. This implies that, at most, display will increase Heinz's market share by 34 percent and, on average, by approximately 14 percent. This is in contrast to Heinz (28 oz.) which has a maximum horizontal difference of 0.01235 or approximately 1.2 percent. This difference is not statistically significant, however. The coefficient on price (α) is statistically significant and has the predicted sign. The interaction parameters presented in Table 6 indicate that this price sensitivity is decreasing in both income (statistically significant) and the number of hours worked (statistically significant), but increasing in the number of children (although not statistically significant). Finally, the coefficient on "summer" is positive and significant, indicating that ketchup sales improve over the warm weather months. Notes: Non-linear parameters refer to those estimated using the GMM estimation procedure. On-Display Interactions Ommited * -Significant at the 5% level ** -Significant at the 1% level Price elasticities of demand are presented in Table 7 . Heinz 32 ounce is the most inelastic of the products. The magnitude of the own-and cross-price elasticities appears to be roughly consistent with those of BDG (2003a) Note: The notat ion "brand i -brand j" represents the elasticity of demand of brand i with respect to the price of brand j. Standard errors are in parentheses.
In Table 8 , inferred wholesale prices are presented. All reported prices are in dollars-per-bottle. The reported wholesale prices are averaged over all stores and weeks. It is, perhaps, not surprising to see that Heinz charges the highest wholesale price for their 28 ounce bottle, which is the highest-priced product (on average). This is followed by Del Monte and then the Heinz 32 ounce bottle. Average retail and manufacturer mark-ups (percentage) are also presented in Table 8 . The mark-ups, generally, all appear to be very similar in magnitude. The largest retail mark-ups are placed on Heinz 28 ounce bottle and Del Monte. A more thorough discussion of ketchup mark-ups appears below in the section below on goodness of fit.
Heinz (32) Notes: "Overall" refers to the mean predicted wholesale price for each brand over all stores and time periods. The "Average % Retail Mark-up" is the average retail mark-up for each ketchup (over stores and time). "On Display" referes to the predicted wholesale price for each brand, conditional upon that brand being on display. "Other Brand on Display" refers to the mean predicted wholesale price for each brand, conditional upon one of the other ketchup brands being on display. Table 8 also shows average wholesale prices for the sample, when we condition on the retailer's display choice. These prices represent the average implied wholesale prices for each brand (w j j , w 0 j ), conditional upon the ketchup display choice. Both of the Heinz products charge their highest wholesale prices when their respective product is in the display space. The opposite is true for the other three products (Hunts, Del Monte, and Catalina). For these three products, there is either no difference (Del Monte) or a marginally lower wholesale price when on-display.
While the retailer's display choice is a deterministic outcome in the data (i.e. I observe either a 1 or 0 in the data for each product's display status during a given week), the manufacturers chose their prices and allowances based on expectations of the retailer's choice. This is because the manufacturer does not have full information regarding the value of allowances offered by rivals. For the manufacturer, therefore, display choices are probabilistic. Econometrically, I must treat these allowances as unobserved as well. A simple test of the econometric model, therefore, is to examine the model's predictions regarding the retailer's display choice. The mean inferred display probabilities (φ) are shown in Table 9 , as well as estimates of π and σ 2 e . When the display b probabilities are compared with the actual retail display choices, as presented in the summary statistics in Table 1 , it is clear that the model slightly overpredicts the likelihood of a ketchup product winning the display space. This could indicate an underestimation of the value of the outside option or an over-prediction of the allowance offers.
Heinz (32) Heinz (28 Merchandising allowance estimates, expressed both as a percentage of the retailer's conditional weekly profit and in dollar terms, are presented in Table  10 . 29 The average allowance payments, as a percentage, range from approximately 0 percent (Del Monte) to 16 percent (Catalina). Catalina and Hunts offer, on average, the largest allowances (both in percentage and dollars) and they offer them more often than the other products. Heinz offers lower allowances for their 28 ounce bottle than they do for their 32 ounce bottle and they offer them significantly less often. These findings indicate that, perhaps, Heinz has made a strategic decision that they will focus their promotional activities on selling the 32 ounce bottle.
Heinz (32) The predicted merchandising allowances can also be compared to the estimates of π and σ 2 e . Averaged over all products offering an allowance, the b predicted (weekly) merchandising allowance is approximately $1.60. The estimate of the variance in manufacturer beliefs (σ 2 e ) is approximately 1.3. It appears that there is a not insignificant degree of uncertainty regarding rivals' allowance offers.
The estimate of π is approximately $6.32. Recall that this value includes b the differential in sales profit plus the merchandising allowance paid by the "outside" product. Table 11 contains information on the average ketchup sales profit, conditional on the retailer's display choice. 30 Comparing the retailer's average sales profit, it appears that displaying Heinz 32 ounce bottle yields the retailer the largest average sale profit increase of $3.12 (relative to not displaying ketchup), while displaying Del Monte gives the retailer virtually no increase in sales profit. Even incorporating the average predicted merchandising allowances (bottom half of Table 10), it is clear that displaying the "outside option" yields the retailer the largest (absolute) profit boost ($6.32 versus $4.48 for Heinz 32 ounce, for example). This implies that, perhaps, other categories benefit more from the display space or that other categories offer larger allowance payments in order to secure the premium shelf space. 30 These figures refer only to the sales profit; they exclude any allowance payment. 
Goodness of Fit
It is useful to examine some tests which allow the performance of the structural model to be evaluated. It should be noted that I do not test, for example, whether the presented model explains the data better than alternative models of behavior.
Chi-square Tests
First, I conduct a traditional chi-square test to see how well the model's predictions compare with what is observed in the data. I examine how well the model predicts each product's prices. The null hypothesis tested is that the model's prediction equals reality. With a test statistic of approximately 0.56, I am unable to reject the hypothesis that the model's predicted prices are equal to the observed prices. This test, while helpful, does not allow me to compare all aspects of the model. Ideally, I would like to be able to compare the predictions regarding the optimal allowance offers. Unfortunately, these allowance payments are often closely-guarded and it is, therefore, difficult to obtain data which would allow me to check the model's predictions.
Predicting Mark-Ups
The second test I present is more of a qualitative test. Thanks to work by BDG (2003a) and Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) , there is some information available regarding the size of mark-ups on ketchup. Using confidential supermarket data, BDG calculate the average percentage retail mark-up on ketchup to be around 34.5 percent. This number is close to the percentage retail mark-up implied by their model (39.5 percent). On the other hand, Villas-Boas and Zhao estimate retail mark-ups that are significantly lower (18 to 26 percent).
Recall the average predicted mark-ups presented in Table 8 . In general, the retail mark-ups predicted by my model fall between these two ranges. Given that BDG use real data on retail mark-ups, it appears that my model underestimates the level of mark-up.
Counterfactual and Welfare Analysis
Whether merchandising allowances lead to higher prices and lower total welfare is a question that has been heavily debated. To provide some insight into this question, I use the parameter estimates to conduct a counterfactual experiment. Specifically, upstream manufacturers will no longer be permitted to offer merchandising allowances in order to obtain the display space. Allowances are set to zero and the retailer chooses a brand for the premium shelf space based solely on the conditional sales profit. Manufacturers must strategically set their wholesale prices in order to maximize their expected profit. I assume that, as before, each manufacturer chooses two conditional wholesale prices: one wholesale price when their product receives the display space and another price for when any other product has been chosen for the display space. A potential complication needs to be addressed before continuing. Recall that the retailer's display choice depends not only on the intra-category (ketchup) pricing decisions, but also on the value of the retailer's outside display option. Without explicitly modeling each category in the supermarket, it is impossible to determine exactly how the value of the outside display option changes when merchandising allowances are prohibited. I use the information in Tables 10 and 11 , however, to come up with a reasonable proxy. Notice from Table 11 that average weekly retailer category sales profit is $6.35 (excluding any allowance payment) when the retailer displays the "outside option." When a ketchup product is displayed, this average weekly retailer category sales profit rises by an average of approximately $2.04. From Table 10 , the average weekly allowance offer (per store) is around $1.00. This implies that, as a rough approximation, the allowances account for 33 percent of the profit differential due to display. I, therefore, assume the differential value of the outside option (b π) to be 66 percent of its original value. 31 To check this specification, I also conducted the counterfactual using 70 percent, 70 percent, 80 percent, and the original estimated value for b π. Although the quantitative values change, the conclusion does not.
The wholesale prices are determined by maximizing the manufacturer's expected profit. With no allowances, manufacturer m's two first order conditions can be rewritten:
Heinz (32) Counterfactual inferred wholesale prices appear in Table 13 . On average, the wholesale prices for all five products are lower. The lower wholesale prices explain why retail prices are also lower in the counterfactual. This result is similar to arguments put forth in the vertical restraints literature. In the literature, it is not uncommon for manufacturers to reduce their wholesale price in an effort to increase the retailer's margin (thereby giving the retailer a greater incentive to promote the manufacturer's product). In my model, when merchandising allowances are not permitted, the wholesale price becomes the primary instrument for manufacturers to compete for the premium shelf space. It should not seem surprising, then, that manufacturers lower their wholesale prices in an effort to make their brand more attractive to the retailer. Those firms with very little chance (or incentive) to aim for the display space, such as Del Monte or Heinz 28 ounce, have the smallest change in wholesale price.
The new average display probabilities appear in Table 14 . It appears as if inter-and intra-category competition is affected by the prohibition on merchandising allowances. In comparison with the results from Table 9 , it appears that the ketchup category, as a whole, receives the display space less frequently in the counterfactual. Within the category, all of the products, with the exception of Heinz 32 ounce bottle, receive the display space less often than they did in the data.
Heinz (32) To help quantify the effect of eliminating merchandising allowances, I calculate the change in consumer welfare associated with its elimination. To evaluate the change in consumer welfare, I rely on consumer surplus. I measure the amount of money consumers would need to be given (under the conditions of the counterfactual) in order to maintain their initial level of utility. Consumer i's change in welfare, therefore, can be expressed:
where
) is the display probability of product k when merchandising allowances are prohibited (allowed), and V noallow ij|D=k (V allow ij|D=k ) is consumer i's expected utility from consuming product j when brand k has the display space and merchandising allowances are prohibited (allowed). Using these definitions, the above equation may be interpreted as the average expected maximized utility under the counterfactual minus the average expected maximized utility with merchandising allowances. This value represents, in dollars, how much better or worse off an individual consumer is because of merchandising allowances.
I find that consumer surplus is diminished because of merchandising allowances. This result is driven by the fact that retail prices for all ketchup products fall in the counterfactual. On average, each consumer, on average, loses approximately $0.013 in welfare annually, due to merchandising allowances. 32 Note that this figure is lower than the predicted price changes because the ketchup category has a relatively high "no purchase" percentage, thereby making the average "overpayment" quite low. This aggregates to an annual decrease in welfare of approximately $1,820 for the entire Springfield, Missouri metropolitan area. For comparison, note that average ketchup sales are slightly over $37,000 in Springfield. Two comments are worth noting here. First, the figures above refer only to the ketchup category. It is difficult to generalize on the overall impact of merchandising allowances because there is likely to be a great deal of variation across industries. Secondly, the numbers above reflect only the change in consumer welfare. When thinking about total welfare, one must not overlook the role of total profit, where "total profit" is defined as retail profit plus manufacturer profits. Although manufacturers might reasonably be expected to lower their wholesale prices in the counterfactual (and, indeed , that is what I have found), the impact on profits is not certain a priori. The impact that lowered wholesale prices have on profits depends on the extent of the price decreases, on the retail passthrough rates, as well as on the likelihood that a ketchup product is chosen for display. Table 15 shows the change in annual retail and manufacturer profit, as well as total producer surplus. According to the calculations in the table, the average total profit per store (store profits for the retailer plus store-specific profits earned by the manufacturers) is lower by $19.55 annually because of merchandising allowances. With allowances, the annual profit of store r is $415.44 and the total profit of manufacturers at store r is $353.94. Without allowances, the average profit of store r would be $407.97 and the total profit of manufacturers at store r would be $380.96. Note: Merc handising allowances are prohibited in the counterfactual experiment. Therefore, all profit calculations refer only to sales profit. Table 16 (along with Table 11 ) provides some indication why retail profit may decrease when allowances are not used. Recall from above that the average increase in retail sales profit is about $2.04 when the retailer displays ketchup (and allowances are used). In the counterfactual, as Table 16 shows, that average increase in retail sales profit is approximately $2.34. This indicates that the average sales profit differential increases in the counterfactual (by $0.30). However, the difference is less than the average weekly merchandising allowance offer ($1.00), so the retailer experiences a net decrease in profit in the counterfactual.
Notice from Table 15 that all manufacturers earn more profit in the counterfactual. This should, perhaps, not be surprising given that manufacturers are, typically, the first to object to "consideration" payments to retailers. It is interesting, however, that Heinz is harmed most by merchandising allowances. This may be due to the fact that Heinz 32 ounce bottle would remain, in the absence of allowances, the most likely ketchup product to receive the display space Because both consumer surplus and producer surplus fall under merchandising allowances, total welfare is unambiguously decreased.
Conclusions and Extensions
Merchandising allowances are an important part of the vertical channel. Firms are increasingly relying on their use and yet our understanding of their impact is limited. This research makes a step towards providing some insight on this issue.
In this paper I estimate a vertical structural model of retailing that allows for the use of merchandising allowances. The utility function is a discretechoice, random coefficients model specified to allow display to affect consumer choices. To account for the way in which retail allowances affect the decisions of manufacturers and retailers, their behavior is explicitly modeled. Parameter estimates are then used to conduct a counterfactual simulation to determine whether the use of merchandising allowances leads to higher prices. The results of the counterfactual imply that merchandising allowances decrease both consumer and social welfare. While the practice allows retailers to increase their profit, this benefit is more than offset by the decrease in manufacturer profits and consumer welfare.
One should be careful in relying too heavily on the aggregate welfare loss calculation presented above. There are some reasons to think that regulations on retailer behavior might affect a number of things, including the retailer's decision of whether to continue to carry all of the products currently offered. The welfare results in the preceding section do not account for this possibility or its consequences.
It has been noted (see Pesendorfer (2002) , for example) that current retailer promotional decisions may decrease sales of the good in subsequent periods. This may be particularly true for storable goods, such as ketchup. I do not incorporate these elements in the model presented above. One possible implication is that if category sales are expected to dramatically fall in future periods, then the value of winning display today (instead of my rival) increases. The merchandising allowance predictions in Table 10 may, therefore, be understated. A possible solution would be to make use of consumer panel data to more explicitly model the probability that a consumer purchases today, conditional upon behavior in previous periods.
Some additional points to be considered in future research include: alternative retailer-manufacturer bargaining approaches (such as in Iyer and Villas-Boas, 2003) , the addition of retailer "feature" choices (which is separate then display) and allowing for multiple retailers to capture the impact of downstream competition.
This research presents one of the first rigorous empirical examinations on merchandising allowances. It extends and contributes to the literature on structural models of vertical competition that follows from BLP's seminal paper. Rather than the definitive word on allowances, this paper should be viewed as the beginning of a new vein of research aimed at empirically examining the effects of merchandising allowances.
